Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem. Method and MatterialThe question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.Discussion and Results Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).ConclusionAll of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its Evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of intellect.

Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem. Method and MatterialThe question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.Discussion and Results Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).ConclusionAll of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its Evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of intellect.

In the poem of mysticism and Sufism, many mystics have spoken about the theme of ‘ intellect’ and have expressed a trinary viewpoint regarding the biological and environmental characteristics as well as external and environmental factors. Some have praised and named him by the name of light and attendant of life. Others, on the contrary, have introduced the intellect as unable, which says nonsense and makes claim and some have sometimes assumed him the ladder of the roof of right and sometimes catena of life. In this writing we have tried to examine the viewpoint of Sanai, Attar and Mowlana as the three main characters in the history of mystical poetry in relation to the key concept of intellect and showed that, in the 74 macro-metaphors, they refer to three types of positive, negative, and two-dimensional metaphors in their sonnets. Metaphors such as guidance, adeptness, laddering of the right roof, eyes, awakening, and awareness are in the realm of positive metaphors. Catena, chain, humiliation, abjectness, prate and rebellion are associated with negative metaphors; and old in the realm of two-dimensional metaphor. Based on these three types of metaphors, it can be said that the historical movement of negative semantic metaphors has ascend from Sanai to Attar and has descend from Attar to Mowlana. The theoretical basis of the research is the theory of cognitive metaphors, which contrary to the traditional view of metaphor, believes that not only language but our daily conceptual system, mind and inside are essentially metaphorical.

The Explanation of the De Anima of Aristotle is the most important issue for Scholastic Philosophers. Averroes as the Commentator of Aristotle, explains De Anima of Aristotle in three works: Short Commentary, Middle Commentary and Long Commentary on de Anima. The latter contains the latest and most perfect of Averroes view about material intellect. He is trying to present a coherent explain about human knowledge that is vague in Aristotle philosophy. For Averroes this faculty must be the identical receptive of external forms and before its thinking, not anyone of them. According to Averroes this intellect is one and shared for all, thae is, Material intellect provides the one and shared knowledge for men. In this article we will investigate the point of Averroes in his explanations of Aristotle, particularly in Long Commentary on de anima.

Active intellect" in Ibn Bajjah's Philosophy is important in epistemology, ethics and human happiness. Therefore, the topic of "active intellect" is discussed in different ways. "Truth of active reason" in the epistemological and existential position, regardless of its importance for the purpose and happiness of man, is the present issue of this article. the question is, what is the existential and epistemological place of active intellect in Ibn Bajjah's theory of intellect. Is it in the human person and related to the soul, or is it in the higher world and something separate from humans? Is it one or plural? Ibn Bajjah assign to the active intellect has the epistemological position of imparting knowledge and forms to the intellects of Human and imaginary images to animals, and in terms of the existential position of the active intellect, his words are mixed and he speaks about the unity or plurality of the intellect in different levels of the intellect, according to the rationality of that intellect and its relationship with the matter. It considers the useful intellect and the active intellect as one. Therefore, in order to investigate this issue and answer the questions raised, we first explain the Cognitive Soul, then we discuss the levels of intellect and what is the active intellect in Ibn Bajjah. And finally, we will analyze and review the said content. The article is written with a descriptive-analytical method

Although being criticized and objected in west, the study of supranational purports is one of the widest areas of research in contemporary comparative studies. Subject is a historical and cultural substance which is and important element of the text, so it can be analyzed and studied. Some subjects and purports are supranational and universal such as freedom, peace, war, justice, death, love, and intellect. Comparative study in this field can explain the history of thoughts and ideas of two or more nations at different periods of time and tell us where they come from. One of the universal subjects that is very important in the Islamic culture and is raised lots of objections among people is the intellect which has different meanings. Therefore, literal and conceptual schools take different meaning from it. The meaning of intellect has entered to literature, so some of the literalists are called rationalist. Naser Khosro Ghobadiani and Abolala Maari are two representatives of intelectualism in Persian and Arabic literature.The aim of this research was to present their point of views about rationalism and intellect, to take the meaning of intellect and its function, and to show that, although there were some similarities between these two rationalists but there were some differences in the way they look at the world.

Specifying the conceptual identity of intellect and distinguishing it from knowledge, this article addresses ethical perfection as the main goal in the human perfection path. The purpose of this article is to specify the Evolutionary interrelationship of intellect and ethics and the outcome of the effects of these two on the perfection of the human from the viewpoint of Islam in general and the narrations of the book Ghurar al-ḥ, ikam in particular. The results of the study reveal that according to Imā, m ‘, Alī, ’, s (a) statements, there is an interrelationship between intellect and ethics, where ethics without intellect is imperfect and intellect without ethics cannot play its role correctly. In this article, first the essential and conceptual differences of intellect and knowledge are given. Then, the mutual Evolutionary effects of intellect and ethics on each other and the role of these two in the Evolutionary movement of the human are discussed.

In a part of mystical literature, as well as the words of some individuals affiliated with mysticism, intellect and mysticism have been portrayed as being at odds with each other and they were presented as two totally irreconcilable and adverse paths. These people consider intellect not as a source and a way of acquiring knowledge, thus, they give no credit to the achievements of intellect, and consequently, to the Humanities. Based on these people’s viewpoint, intellect is not only an invalid resource of knowledge but also a barrier to acquiring knowledge and a cause of falling into aberration. Interestingly, some of such individuals have resorted to logical reasoning to discredit intellect. In the present paper, some of the argumentations of these people will be addressed and investigated. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the opposition of some mystics, or so-called mystics, to intellect does not indicate as to the opposition of all mystics to intellect or the irreconcilability and conflict of mysticism and intellect, for such oppositions could simply originate from a lack of proper understanding of mysticism and intellect. We believe that not only are not mysticism and intellect irreconcilable, they are mutually confirming and supporting. The pinnacle of this mutual confirmation and support can be seen in Mulla-Sadra’s Transcendent Theosophy.

The matter of intellect, its significance, essence and function in human being and its position in man’s knowledge is the most important subjects in philosophy. Greek philosophy reached to the Islamic world through schools such as Jondishapoor and caused agreement and oppositional views in Islamic world. Sufis must be known as opponents and criticizers of philosophical intellect. Their critiques grew up among mystical texts, prose or verse, especially from 5th and 6th century A.H. It seems that Sufis at the beginning of Islam such as Mohasebi and Ahmad-Ibn- Abel Havari had not true concept of intellect. Zonnoon; between intellect and duty, believed on necessity and Mostamli Bokhari believed on intellect as a tool of science. The other Sufis accepted intellect as distinguished element on ethical realm but the majority of them knew intellect as a servitude and the contrariety between intellect and love that has been seen among Sufis sayings in next centuries till 5th century A.H. is not noticeable.